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a b s t r a c t
Two novel coronaviruses have emerged to cause severe disease in humans. While bats may be the
primary reservoir for both viruses, SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) likely crossed into humans from civets
in China, and MERS coronavirus (MERS-CoV) has been transmitted from camels in the Middle East.
Unlike SARS-CoV that resolved within a year, continued introductions of MERS-CoV present an on-going
public health threat. Animal models are needed to evaluate countermeasures against emerging viruses.
With SARS-CoV, several animal species were permissive to infection. In contrast, most laboratory
animals are refractory or only semi-permissive to infection with MERS-CoV. This host-range restriction
is largely determined by sequence heterogeneity in the MERS-CoV receptor. We describe animal
models developed to study coronaviruses, with a focus on host-range restriction at the level of the
viral receptor and discuss approaches to consider in developing a model to evaluate countermeasures
against MERS-CoV.
& 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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Introduction
Within the last two decades, there have been several introduc-
tions of zoonotic pathogens into the human population. Speciﬁ-
cally, two novel coronaviruses (CoV), Severe Acute Respiratory
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Syndrome-CoV (SARS-CoV) and Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome-CoV (MERS-CoV) caused signiﬁcant concern because
they crossed the species barrier and caused severe disease. While
SARS-CoV originated in Asia and spread rapidly to several coun-
tries throughout the world, MERS-CoV has largely been restricted
to infections acquired in the Middle East. Both viruses are
associated with spread from person to person and a high case-
fatality rate, thus the development of animal models for evaluation
of anti-viral therapies and vaccines has been a high priority.
SARS-CoV emerged in the Guangdong province of southern
China in November, 2002 (Severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), 2003). Retrospective analysis identiﬁed 11 cases between
November 2002 and March 2003. Of these, 7 had documented
contact with wild animals (Chinese SMEC, 2004; Zhong et al.,
2003; Peiris et al., 2003). In February, 2003 an infected person
traveled to Hong Kong and stayed at Hotel M (Tsang et al., 2003).
At the hotel, he spread the virus to several visitors who returned to
their home countries (Canada, Ireland, the United States, Vietnam
and Singapore) starting the global SARS-CoV epidemic (Peiris et
al., 2003; Tsang et al., 2003; Poutanen et al., 2003; Ruan et al.,
2003; Ksiazek et al., 2003). In total, 8437 SARS-CoV cases with 813
fatalities were reported (WHO, 2003a, 2003b). As a result of a
coordinated public health effort involving screening, isolation,
contact tracing and quarantine efforts, the human chain of
transmission of SARS-CoV was broken (WHO, 2003a; Booth
et al., 2003; Chan et al., 2003; Donnelly et al., 2003; Karlberg
et al., 2004). Since the end of the outbreak, there have been a few
incidents of laboratory-acquired SARS-CoV infections (Normile
and Vogel, 2003; Normile, 2004; Liang et al., 2004), and over
two weeks in December 2003 to January 2004, 4 individuals in
Guangzhou, China became infected with SARS-CoV. None of these
patients died from infection and the virus was not transmitted to
contacts (Liang et al., 2004). Since early 2004, SARS-CoV has not
re-emerged and no new community-acquired infections have been
reported. However, closely related coronaviruses have been iden-
tiﬁed in bats and at least one bat virus is able to bind the human
receptor and infect human cells (Ge et al., 2013; Lau et al., 2005).
In contrast, the MERS-CoV outbreak is on-going. MERS-CoV
was initially isolated from a severely ill patient in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, in June of 2012 (Zaki et al., 2012; Bermingham et al., 2012).
Since then, there have been continued reports of new infections in
geographically distinct regions suggesting separate zoonotic intro-
ductions (WHO, 2014). Secondary transmission to health-care
workers and family members has also been reported, and the
WHO estimates that up to 75% of cases represent secondary
infections (Al-Tawﬁq and Memish, 2014). As of early December
2014, 955 laboratory conﬁrmed cases of MERS-CoV infection and
386 deaths have been reported (ECDC, 2014) MERS-CoV infections
have been reported in at least 9 countries in the Middle East
including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman,
Jordan, Kuwait, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iran, and there have been
isolated incidents of infected travelers returning to countries in
Europe, South East Asia, and the United States (Reusken et al.,
2013a, 2013b; Meyer et al., 2014; Nowotny and Kolodziejek, 2014;
Alagaili et al., 2014; Hemida et al., 2013; Haagmans et al., 2014;
Memish et al., 2014; Azhar et al., 2014; Adney et al., 2014).
Both SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV belong to the order Nidovirales,
family Coronavirus. They are both betacoronaviruses and belong to
lineages B and C (Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), 2003;
Lau et al., 2005; Zaki et al., 2012). As members of the Coronaviridae
family, both viruses have a host cell derived lipid envelope and
contain a non-segmented positive-stranded RNA genome (Masters
and Perlman, 2013; van Boheemen et al., 2012). The viral genome
encodes a series of nested subgenomic RNAs that express multiple
gene products. Coronaviruses attach and enter cells via interactions of
the Spike (S) protein with cell surface receptors. For SARS-CoV,
human Angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) and CD209L were
identiﬁed as cellular receptors (Li et al., 2003; Jeffers et al., 2004);
ACE2 is the predominant receptor as CD209L has a much lower
afﬁnity for the S protein (Jeffers et al., 2004). The cell surface receptor
for MERS-CoV is human dipeptidy peptidase 4 (hDPP4), also known
as CD26 (Raj et al., 2013). For both SARS and MERS-CoV, the S protein
host-receptor interaction is considered a major determinant of host
restriction (Masters and Perlman, 2013).
Both viruses are closely related to coronaviruses identiﬁed in
bats: bat-SARS-CoV from Chinese horseshoe bats and SARS-CoV
(Lau et al., 2005), and HKU4, HKU5 and MERS-CoV (Lau et al., 2005;
Zaki et al., 2012). While bats may be the primary reservoir for
MERS-CoV, surveillance studies found high rates of seropositivity in
dromedary camels from several Middle Eastern countries (Reusken
et al., 2013a, 2013b; Meyer et al., 2014; Nowotny and Kolodziejek,
2014; Alagaili et al., 2014; Hemida et al., 2013) indicating that
camels play a role as a reservoir. This was strengthened by studies
that identiﬁed MERS-CoV RNA in nasal swabs from 3 camels on a
farm associated with 2 human cases (Haagmans et al., 2014), and
additional studies in which a camel isolate was directly linked to a
fatal human case in Saudi Arabia (Memish et al., 2014; Azhar et al.,
2014). Furthermore, experimental infection of dromedary camels
demonstrated that they could be productively infected and shed
high titers of virus in their nasal secretions (Adney et al., 2014).
However, the relative role of camels and bats as reservoirs for
MERS-CoV remains to be determined.
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Fig. 1. Schematic of strategies to develop an animal model to meet the FDA Animal
Efﬁcacy Rule. Under the FDA's Animal Efﬁcacy Rule (“Animal Rule”) therapeutics
against rare, emerging, or virulent agents can achieve regulatory approval provided
efﬁcacy is demonstrated in two animal models (one of which must be a non-rodent
species). Animal species of interest must ﬁrst be evaluated for permissiveness to
viral replication and presentation of clinical disease. As an alternative, in animal
species that are permissive but do not show clinical disease, serial passage can be
performed. After an animal model has been developed the resulting disease must
be characterized. The ideal animal model is permissive to infection and reproduces
the clinical illness and pathology observed in humans.
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For SARS-CoV, several animal species were evaluated as models of
human disease and while most laboratory animals including mice,
hamsters, ferrets and non-human primates could be productively
infected (Roberts et al., 2008), few species displayed overt clinical
disease. Following serial adaptation of SARS-CoV in mice (Roberts et
al., 2007) and the engineering of transgenic mice to express human
ACE2 (McCray et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2007), this obstacle was
partially overcome. The development of these murine models
enabled efﬁcacy studies of anti-viral agents and several vaccines
against SARS-CoV (Hilgenfeld and Peiris, 2013; Graham et al., 2013).
In contrast, several animal species have been evaluated for MERS-CoV
but with the exception of some primate species, most animals are
resistant to infection. Herein, we describe the animal models for both
SARS and MERS-CoV with a focus on the role of the host receptor. We
conclude by discussing other approaches that could be used to
develop animal models of MERS-CoV.
Strategies for the development of animal models of infectious
diseases
Animal models of infectious diseases serve two key purposes:
1) to characterize viral pathogenesis, and 2) to evaluate anti-viral
agents and vaccines. In the context of infectious diseases for which
it is not feasible or ethical to perform clinical trials, animal studies
play an additional role. Under the FDA's Animal Efﬁcacy Rule
(“Animal Rule”) therapeutics against rare, emerging, or virulent
agents can achieve regulatory approval provided efﬁcacy is
demonstrated in two animal models (one of which must be a
non-rodent species) that display clinical illness representative of
human disease (FDA, 2014).
The ideal animal model is permissive to infection and reproduces
the clinical course and pathology observed in humans. An algorithm
for the development of animal models is presented in Fig. 1. Small
animal models offer several advantages over NHPs including avail-
ability of animals and species speciﬁc reagents, ease of handling,
reduced cost, and the ability to use sufﬁcient numbers for statistical
analysis. Especially with coronaviruses, rodents vary in susceptibility
and may be semi-permissive to infection and refractory to clinical
disease (Subbarao et al., 2004), even so, they can be used to screen
countermeasures (Yang et al., 2004; Bisht et al., 2004; Buchholz et al.,
2004; Roberts et al., 2006). Thus, to generate a rodent model that
displays clinical disease it may be necessary to adapt the virus to
enhance virulence for the rodent host or generate transgenic animals.
Pathogenesis in these models should be fully characterized because
the disease mechanism of an adapted virus or in a transgenic animal
may be different from that in the natural host (Fig. 1).
As NHPs are closely related to humans, they are invaluable as
animal models. Since studies in NHP incur signiﬁcant expense, most
investigators choose to screen therapies in small animal models and
then perform more limited primate studies. It is important to note
that there are several species and subspecies of NHP that can result in
signiﬁcant variation in the level of viral replication and clinical
disease. Thus, several species must often be evaluated to yield a
suitable animal model. Collectively, the development of animal
models in both rodents and NHP has been fundamental to the study
of infectious diseases and has lead to the development of counter-
measures against several zoonotic pathogens.
Animal models of SARS-CoV
Mouse models
Several inbred mouse strains have been evaluated as models
for SARS-CoV infection (Subbarao et al., 2004; Glass et al., 2004;
Hogan et al., 2004; Wentworth et al., 2004). Initial studies in 4–6
week old BALB/c mice demonstrated that virus doses of 103 and
105 median tissue culture infectious doses (TCID50) of the Urbani
strain given intranasally resulted in a productive infection with
peak titers on day 3 and resolution by day 7. Mice did not lose
weight, display signs of clinical disease or develop pulmonary
pathology. Studies in C57BL/6 (B6) mice yielded similar results,
with a lack of clinical disease and clearance of virus by day 9.
Knockout mice on the B6 background including beige and CD1 /
strains that lack NK cell function and NK-T cells, respectively, and
RAG1 / mice that lack T and B lymphocytes also did not develop
clinical disease. Viral kinetics were similar in B6, beige, CD1 /
mice, and RAG1 / mice (Glass et al., 2004). Similarly, 129SvEv
mice displayed peak viral replication on day 3 with clearance by
day 8 and did not develop clinical illness. Histopathological
examination showed evidence of self-limiting bronchiolitis and
patchy interstitial pneumonia. In contrast, disease progression was
signiﬁcantly altered in STAT1 / mice on the 129SvEv back-
ground. STAT1/ mice displayed progressive weight loss and
bronchiolitis that progressed to interstitial pneumonia and med-
iastinitis (Hogan et al., 2004). Viral replication peaked on day
3 and persisted until day 22 post-infection indicating that a type I
IFN response is required to control SARS-CoV infection. Although
mice showed evidence of infection and lung disease, inbred mouse
strains did not accurately reproduce the diffuse alveolar damage,
edema, pneumocyte necrosis, and hyaline membrane formation
observed in humans (Ding et al., 2003; Franks et al., 2003; Nicholls
et al., 2003).
To model the epidemiological ﬁnding that advanced age
resulted in increased mortality, an aged mouse model of SARS-
CoV was developed. In this model, 12–14 month old BALB/c and B6
mice support high levels of viral replication in the lungs from day
2 to 6 with resolution by day 9. Both strains of mice lose weight
(7–8% on day 5) and aged BALB/c mice displayed rufﬂed fur and
dehydration (Roberts et al., 2008, 2005b). In contrast, aged
129SvEv mice did not support prolonged pulmonary viral replica-
tion and cleared the virus by day 5 (Roberts et al., 2008).
Regardless, all aged mouse strains displayed similar histopatholo-
gical features early during infection (i.e. day 3) including perivas-
cular and peribronchiolar mononuclear inﬁltrates, necrotic debris
in the bronchioles, and foci of interstitial pneumonitis (Roberts et
al., 2008, 2005b). On day 5 post-infection, aged BALB/c mice
displayed prominent perivascular inﬁltrates and alveolar damage
that persisted until day 9 (Roberts et al., 2005b). Collectively, the
pathological changes observed in the aged mouse model more
closely resemble those observed in humans and as a result aged
mice have been used more extensively than young mice.
To develop a mouse model of SARS-CoV infection with asso-
ciated mortality, transgenic mice expressing human ACE2 have
been generated (McCray et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2007; Netland et
al., 2008; Tseng et al., 2007). In general, disease severity in
transgenic mice correlated with the level of hACE2 expression.
Transgenic mice expressing hACE2 under the control of a cytoker-
atine promoter had high levels of ACE2 mRNA in the lung, liver,
colon, and kidney (McCray et al., 2007; Netland et al., 2008). When
these mice were challenged with SARS-CoV, they developed a
severe infection beginning in the airway epithelium that spread to
the brain. Infection resulted in weight loss beginning between
days 3 and 5, and 100% mortality by day 7 (McCray et al., 2007;
Netland et al., 2008). Using an alternate approach in which hACE2
was expressed under the control of a chicken beta-actin promoter
with an cytomegalovirus IE enhancer, transgenic mouse lines with
differing levels of hACE2 were generated (Tseng et al., 2007).
Infection of mice with high levels of hACE2 expression similarly
yielded a severe lung and brain infection with 100% mortality.
In contrast, infection of mice expressing lower levels of hACE2
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resulted in clinical illness without associated mortality (Tseng et
al., 2007). This ﬁnding was further supported by a third model in
which hACE2 was expressed under the control of the mouse ACE2
promoter resulting in limited tissue distribution of hACE2. When
these mice were challenged with SARS-CoV, they became lethargic
but survived infection (Yang et al., 2007). These mice also showed
severe interstitial pneumonia with extrapulmonary organ damage
suggesting that they more accurately modeled human SARS-CoV
infection. However, in all of these studies, an increase in viral load
or viral antigen was observed in the brain tissue of transgenic
mice, and mortality resulted from extensive dissemination of the
virus in the brain (McCray et al., 2007). This ﬁnding is in contrast
to human disease in which central nervous system infection was
only rarely observed. Thus, while transgenic mice resulted in a
lethal model of SARS-CoV infection, no mouse model accurately
reproduced the disease spectrum observed in SARS-CoV infected
patients.
Syrian hamster model
Golden Syrian hamsters are highly permissive to SARS-CoV
infection (Roberts et al., 2008, 2005a; Lamirande et al., 2008).
Infection of hamsters with SARS-CoV (103 or 105 TCID50 of the
Urbani strain) results in a productive infection with peak replica-
tion on day 2–3 in the nasal turbinates and lungs, and viral
clearance by day 7. Infection also results in extrapulmonary spread
consisting of transient viremia and spread to the liver and spleen
in a proportion (1/3 or 2/3) of animals. Viral replication is
accompanied by pulmonary histopathology consisting of focal
areas of interstitial inﬂammation and consolidation that are visible
on day 3, and become more widespread until day 7 when con-
solidation involves 30–40% of the lung (Roberts et al., 2005a).
Despite the extensive pulmonary pathology, hamsters do not
display overt clinical disease or mortality. Weight loss is difﬁcult
to assess in hamsters due to the storage of food in large cheek
pouches; however, the use of a running wheel with a rotation
counter permitted objective measurement of nocturnal activity of
these animals. Compared to mock-infected hamsters and pre-
infection activity levels, SARS-CoV infected hamsters exhibited a
greater than 90% reduction in activity (Roberts et al., 2008;
Lamirande et al., 2008). This was the ﬁrst objective measurement
of clinical illness in hamsters.
In subsequent studies, hamsters were also shown to be sus-
ceptible to several different strains of SARS-CoV (Roberts et al.,
2008). These strains included Urbani, HKU-39849, Frankfurt 1, and
a recombinant clone GD03T0013. Infection with Frk-1 resulted in
limited mortality in 3 of 20 animals, while all other strains did not
produce a lethal infection. Collectively, these studies demonstrate
that the hamster represents a suitable model of SARS-CoV infec-
tion; although much like the young and aged mouse models,
mortality was not a prominent feature of the model (Liang et al.,
2005; Watts et al., 2008).
Ferret model
Ferrets represent an excellent model of inﬂuenza infection and
as a result were evaluated for susceptibility to SARS-CoV. Infection
of ferrets with virus doses from 103 to 107 TCID50 yielded a
productive infection in lungs, trachea and nasal turbinates. Viral
replication peaked in the lungs on day 5 or 6, and reached levels of
106 TCID50/mL of lung homogenate (Chu et al., 2008; Martina et al.,
2003; ter Meulen et al., 2004; Weingartl et al., 2004). The primary
histopathological ﬁnding was of multifocal pulmonary lesions
affecting 5–10% of the lung with mild alveolar damage, and
peribronchiolar and perivascular lymphocyte inﬁltration (Martina
et al., 2003; ter Meulen et al., 2004; van den Brand et al., 2008).
Reports on clinical disease vary. In initial studies utilizing intra-
tracheal administration, 3 of 6 infected ferrets became lethargic
and one animal succumbed to disease, and in a study utilizing the
Toronto-2 (Tor2) SARS-CoV isolate, lethargy and prolonged disease
was also observed (Martina et al., 2003; Kobinger et al., 2007).
In subsequent reports using either intratracheal or intranasal
administration lethargy or mortality were not observed (Chu et
al., 2008; ter Meulen et al., 2004; Weingartl et al., 2004; Darnell et
al., 2007). Furthermore, in a study speciﬁcally designed to assess
the ferret as a non-rodent model to meet the criteria for the FDA
“Animal Rule”, clinical disease was limited to fever and sneezing in
large groups of ferrets inoculated with the Toronto-2 strain (Chu et
al., 2008). In a single study, contact transmission of SARS-CoV to
uninfected cage mates was reported along with conjunctivitis and
mortality on days 16 and 21 (Martina et al., 2003). Histopatholo-
gical analysis found evidence of hepatic lipidosis and emaciation
indicating mortality was not associated with SARS-CoV pneumo-
nia. These ﬁndings indicate that SARS-CoV could transmit at low
levels by direct contact in the ferret model. In summary ferrets
were shown to support SARS-CoV replication with varying degrees
of clinical disease, and much like the rodent models, SARS-CoV
infection did not result in signiﬁcant mortality.
Non-human primate models
Six NHP species have been evaluated as models of SARS-CoV
infection. These include three Old World Monkeys: rhesus and
cynomolgus macaques, and African Green monkeys, and three
New World Monkeys: common marmoset, squirrel monkeys, and
mustached tamarins (Kuiken et al., 2003; Lawler et al., 2006;
Fouchier et al., 2003; Roberts and Subbarao, 2006; McAuliffe et al.,
2004; Rowe et al., 2004; Qin et al., 2005; Rockx et al., 2011;
Greenough et al., 2005). With the exception of squirrel monkeys
and mustached tamarins (Roberts and Subbarao, 2006), all NHPs
examined support SARS-CoV replication. Initial studies were
performed in cynomolgus macaques to demonstrate that SARS-
CoV fulﬁlled Koch's postulates. In these studies, virus was isolated
from nasal secretions, and virus could be detected in lung samples
by RT-PCR. Consistent with virus isolation, the animals had
pulmonary pathology indicative of interstitial pneumonia and
representative of mild human disease. In these and other studies
using cynomolgus macaques a range of clinical illness has been
reported with observations ranging from skin rash, decreased
activity, cough, and respiratory distress, to an absence of clinical
disease (Lawler et al., 2006; McAuliffe et al., 2004; Rowe et al.,
2004; Rockx et al., 2011).
To compare Old World monkey species, African Green mon-
keys, cynomolgus, and Rhesus macaques were challenged in
parallel with SARS-CoV Urbani strain. No animals developed
clinical disease and all three species had viral replication in
combined nasal-throat swabs, and in tracheal lavage samples
(McAuliffe et al., 2004). Viral replication was highest in African
Green monkeys, followed by cynomolgus and then Rhesus maca-
ques. Viral titers peaked by day 2 with clearance in the upper and
lower respiratory tract by days 8 and 10, respectively. All three
species produced neutralizing antibodies and antibody titers
correlated with virus replication. Pulmonary pathology was exam-
ined in African Green monkeys on days 2 and 4 post-infection.
Consistent with the features of interstitial pneumonia, on day
2 there were focal interstitial mononuclear inﬂammatory inﬁl-
trates and edema in the lung. Staining for viral antigen identiﬁed
type 1 pneumocytes as the predominant cell type infected by
SARS-CoV, and on day 4 there was a reduction in the amount of
viral antigen and level of inﬂammation (McAuliffe et al., 2004).
In a subsequent study on Rhesus macaques challenged with the
SARS-CoV PUMC01 strain, virus could be detected in nasal and
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pharyngeal swabs, and on days 5 and 7 pulmonary histopathology
was similarly consistent with interstitial pneumonia (Qin et al.,
2005).
Infection of common marmosets also resulted in mild clinical
disease with 50% of animals developing a febrile response and
diarrhea (Greenough et al., 2005). Due to technical challenges,
replicating virus could not be isolated from lung homogenates;
however, high levels of vRNA were detected in lung samples on
both days 4 and 7 post-infection. Marmosets developed both
pulmonary and hepatic pathology with evidence of interstitial
pneumonitis at all time points (days 2, 4, and 7). Hepatic lesions
started to develop on day 2 and were readily apparent in 4 of
5 animals on day 4. On day 7 all animals had evidence of
multifocal hepatitis. Hepatic lesions were also observed in human
patients and the marmoset was the only NHP to develop liver
disease (Greenough et al., 2005). Collectively, the NHP species that
were permissive to SARS-CoV infection modeled differing aspects
of human disease with African Green monkeys supporting high
levels of replication in the respiratory tract and marmosets
modeling hepatic pathology. All species showed evidence of
interstitial pneumonia, however, no species consistently repro-
duced severe clinical disease and mortality was not observed in
any species.
Role of ACE2 in animal models of SARS-CoV infection
ACE2 was identiﬁed as the functional receptor for SARS-CoV in
African Green monkey derived Vero E6 cells (Li et al., 2003).
Subsequent crystallography studies identiﬁed 14 amino acid posi-
tions in ACE2 that have direct contact with the S protein receptor-
binding domain (RBD) (see Table 1) (Li et al., 2005a). As civet
(c) ACE2 displayed afﬁnity for both human (Tor2 and GD03) and
civet SARS-CoV isolates (Sz02 and Gd05), while human (h) ACE2
preferentially bound the S protein RBD of human isolates, bio-
chemical studies were performed to deﬁne mutations inﬂuencing
RBD afﬁnity (Li, 2008; Wu et al., 2012, 2011; Li et al., 2005b). These
studies identiﬁed two regions of interaction between the S protein
RBD and ACE2 at which mutations evolved to accommodate a
switch in preference from cACE2 to hACE2 (Li, 2008; Wu et al.,
2012, 2011). The two regions were designated hotspot 31 and
hotspot 353. In hotspot 31, residues K31 and E35 of hACE2 interact
to form a salt bridge, and E35 in turn interacts with N479 of the S
protein RBD. In contrast, the RBD of civet isolates has a 479K
mutation and this lysine residue competes with E35 of hACE2
destabilizing the salt bridge and diminishing binding. To compen-
sate, civet ACE2 has a Threonine (T) at position 31. This removes
the salt bridge structure and the destabilizing effect of 479K,
permitting high afﬁnity binding (Li, 2008).
The interaction of amino acids at or near position 353 of ACE2
was also found to play a signiﬁcant role in RBD–ACE2 afﬁnity. Both
hACE2 and cACE2 have lysine (K) at position 353, and in hACE2
K353 interacts with aspartate (D) 38 to form a second salt bridge.
Formation of this bridge requires additional support from threo-
nine (T) 487 from the S protein RBD of human SARS-CoV strains.
In civet isolates, there is a serine (S) at position 487 that does not
support the formation of a salt bridge with D38, resulting in
decreased afﬁnity for hACE2. In cACE2 position 38 encodes a
glutamate (E) that has a longer side chain than aspartate. This
allows E38 to support the formation of a salt bridge in the absence
of T487 and promotes binding of the civet isolates to cACE2 (Li,
2008).
In the context of animal models of SARS-CoV infection, the
interactions of the S protein RBD at these hot spots may partially
explain the varying levels of replication observed in different
species. In Table 1, we have compared the ACE2 amino acids that
interact with the S protein RBD from several species. Examining
the human, AGM, and macaque ACE2 residues, all 4 species have
identical RBD–ACE2 interaction residues. The marmoset and
hamster ACE2 residues are very similar to those of hACE2 and
this is in agreement with the permissive nature of these species.
In contrast, many of the residues of mouse ACE2 are different from
those of human ACE2 (Li et al., 2005a) and this corresponds with
reduced replication of SARS-CoV in mouse cells (Li et al., 2004) and
the lungs of young mice (Subbarao et al., 2004). While mice are
semi-permissive to SARS-CoV, rats do not support replication of
SARS-CoV. Two changes relative to human ACE2, at positions 353
and 82 of mouse and rat ACE2 are predicted to account for this
difference in replication (Li et al., 2005a). Both mice and rats have
a histidine at position 353 compared to 353K in hACE2. This
partially disrupts the S protein–DPP4 interaction (Li et al., 2005a);
moreover, the asparagine (N) 82 of rat ACE2 introduces a glyco-
sylation site that blocks the interaction at position 82 with residue
L472 of the S protein RBD. In contrast, mouse ACE2 has a serine
(S) at position 82, that though sub-optimal, does not prevent the
interaction with the S protein. Together the combined changes in
mACE2 at position 353 and 82 lead to inefﬁcient binding of the S
protein and reduced permissiveness of mouse cells, while the
glycosylation site at residue 82 in rat ACE2 abrogates binding (Li et
al., 2005a).
Examination of the hamster ACE2 sequence at position 82 also
reveals an asparagine (N) residue and examination of the sur-
rounding amino acid residues indicates the presence of a glycosy-
lation site. This is surprising as hamsters are highly permissive to
SARS-CoV; however, the inhibitory effect of N82 may be overcome
by the multiple additional interactions (i.e. K353) that are shared
by human and hamster ACE2. It is tempting to speculate that
hamsters may have developed lethal or more pronounced clinical
disease if the amino acid residue at position 82 had been similar to
that of hACE2.
Of interest, most of the ferret ACE2 interaction residues are
different from those of hACE2; thus it is surprising that ferrets are
permissive to SARS-CoV infection. Comparing civet and ferret
ACE2, many of the residues are the same, and experimental studies
have shown that civets can be infected with human isolates (Wu et
al., 2005). Thus, while the ferret ACE2 may be different from
hACE2, the similarity with cACE2 may result in afﬁnity between
ferret ACE2 and the S protein RBD permitting infection and
replication.
In summary, the structural analysis of ACE2–S protein interac-
tions agree with observations of improved replication in several
animal models. However, this ﬁnding does not fully explain the
host restriction and limited clinical disease observed in animal
models. Despite high degrees of similarity between NHP ACE2
sequences and hACE2, NHPs do not recapitulate human disease
and within the NHP species there is variation in the level of viral
replication. Furthermore, aged mice develop disease and support
replication despite reduced afﬁnity of mACE2 for the S protein
RBD. Thus, while it is clear the interaction of ACE2 with the S
protein-RBD is required for efﬁcient infection and replication,
additional host factors likely also contribute to the development
of severe disease.
Mouse-adaptation of SARS-CoV
As an alternative to evaluating multiple animal species, another
strategy to generate an animal model with clinical disease is to
adapt the virus to the new host by serial passage (Fig. 1). To
generate a mouse model with associated mortality, the SARS-CoV
Urbani strain was serially passaged in the lungs of young BALB/c
mice (Roberts et al., 2007). After 15 passages, a single virus clone
was isolated that caused 100% mortality in young (6–8 week old),
4 week old, and aged BALB/c mice. This virus was designated
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Table 1
ACE2 amino acid residues from different species that interact with S proteins from SARS coronaviruses.
ACE2 sequencen Amino acid positions at which sequences differ from human ACE2 sequence (human ACE2 numbering)
24 27 31 34 35nn 37 38 41 42 45 79 82 83 90 325 329 330 353 354
Species Human Q T K H E E D Y Q L L M Y N Q E N K G
African Green
monkey
Rhesus macaque
Cynomolgus
macaquea
Marmoseta H E T
Civet L T Y Q E V T D
Ferret L Y E H T D E N R
Rat K S Q I N P T H
Mouse N N Q T S F T A H
Hamstera Q N
Receptor binding site Corresponding amino acid positions and residues of SARS-CoV spike proteins that interact with ACE2
S protein sequence in indicated
virus
Tor2 N473 Y475 Y475
Y442
Y440
N479
N479nn Y491 Y436 Y484 T486
T487
Y436
Y484
Y484 L472 L472 N473
Y475
T402 R426 R426 T486 G488 T487
Y491
Y491
G488
MA15 Y436H Y436H
v2163 Y442F Y436H Y436H
MA20 Y442L N479K
Sites that play an important role in host range and cross species infection are indicated in bold type and are underlined.
Accession numbers: Human (AB046569), African Green monkey (AY996037), Rhesus macaque (NM_001135696), Cynomolgus macaque* (XM_005593037), Marmoset* (XM_008988993.1), Civet (AY881174), Ferret (AB208708), Rat
(NM_001012006), Mouse (NM_001130513), Hamster* (XM_005074209).
Adapted from Li et al. (2005).
n Only residues that are different from human DPP4 are displayed.
nn Position 35 does not directly contact the S-protein RBD but inﬂuences interactions at positions 31 and 38.
a Predicted sequence of DPP4.
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MA15. Severe disease was the result of an overwhelming viral
infection with signiﬁcantly higher titers and prolonged replication
in the lungs accompanied by extensive damage to bronchiolar and
alveolar epithelial cells (Roberts et al., 2007). MA15 was also
capable of extrapulmonary spread as evident by viremia, and
recovery of virus from spleen, liver, and brain tissues. Sequence
analysis and reverse genetics studies identiﬁed 6 amino acid
mutations associated with the lethal phenotype. These mutations
included 3 changes in ORF1a, and single changes in ORF1b, the M
protein, and the S protein. Of particular interest, the mutation in
the S protein Y436H was located in the S protein RBD. In follow-up
studies, the relative contribution of each mutation in MA15 was
deﬁned using a panel of recombinant viruses (Frieman et al.,
2012). Reversion of four mutations did not alter virulence, how-
ever, reversion of the nsp9 (located in ORF1a) or S protein
mutations resulted in reduced weight loss from 420% to
10–20% and less than 5% for the nsp9 and S protein mutations,
respectively. Furthermore, reversion of the S protein mutation
resulted in a non-lethal infection with no clinical disease. Intro-
duction of the S protein and nsp9 mutations either alone or
combined into the Urbani infectious clone failed to induce a lethal
infection in young BALB/c mice indicating that the S protein and
nsp9 mutations were necessary but not sufﬁcient to induce severe
disease. Given that 6 mutations were present in MA15, the
additional mutations in ORF1a, ORF1b, and the M gene may have
lead to enhanced disease by promoting interactions with host cell
proteins involved in viral replication (Frieman et al., 2012;
Zornetzer et al., 2010). Alternatively, these mutations may also
alter the host response as STAT/ mice progressed more rapidly
to a terminal endpoint when inoculated with MA15 compared to
wild-type virus (Frieman et al., 2010).
To develop additional mouse-adapted virus strains, the Urbani
strain was similarly passaged 20 or 25 times in two separate
studies to yield lethal virus strains termed MA20 and Strain v2163
(Frieman et al., 2012; Day et al., 2009). In a direct comparison with
MA15, infection with Strain v2163 resulted in signiﬁcantly higher
pulmonary virus titers and enhanced mortality at lower doses. Ten
amino acid changes in v2163 were associated with adaptation and
4 mutations arose in the S protein. More speciﬁcally, Y436H and a
second mutation at Y442F were identiﬁed in the RBD. An addi-
tional mutation K411E in the RBD was found in some samples, but
was not found in the lungs of infected mice. The two remaining S
protein mutations were T1118I and N1169D and were located
outside the RBD in the S2 heptad repeat elements (Day et al.,
2009). Sequencing of the MA20 strain revealed 6 amino acid
mutations with two changes in the S protein binding domain:
Y442L and N479K (Frieman et al., 2012).
The changes that arose during mouse adaptation in the S
protein RBD are predicted to enhance afﬁnity or binding of the S
protein to mACE2. In human SARS-CoV strains, residue Y436 of the
S protein interacts with hACE2 at residues D38 and Q42. This
interaction is within hotspot 31 and binding is further inﬂuenced
by residue 353K of hACE2. In mACE2 the K353H mutation inter-
feres with the interaction between Y436 of the S protein RBD and
D38 of mACE2. Thus, in MA15, the mutation Y436H that arose with
serial passage overcomes this interference (Frieman et al., 2012)
promoting enhanced binding. In the MA20 strain, two mutations
evolved in the RBD: Y442L and N479K. These mutations are
predicted to form polar interactions with N30 and N31 of mACE2,
and the change of Y442L removes a bulky side chain permitting
access and enhancing binding of K479 to N30 and N31 (Frieman
et al., 2012). The v2163 strain contains mutations, Y436H and
Y442F. As described above the Y436H mutation most likely
compensates for mACE2 353H. The extent of steric clash between
N31 of mACE2 and Y442 has not been described; however, the
Y442F change removes a hydroxyl group from the binding
interface and this is predicted to enhance the interaction with
mACE2 (Frieman et al., 2012).
The mouse adaptation studies yielded several SARS-CoV strains
capable of causing lethal disease in mice. These strains represent
an advance in the development of an animal model for the
“Animal Rule” though the disease mechanism in young mice is
different from that in humans. The use of the MA15 virus in aged
mice has proved to be a valuable model for the study of SARS-CoV
vaccine candidates. Studies examining mutations that arose upon
serial passage and detailed analysis of S protein ACE2 interactions
emphasize the role of the S protein in host restriction and
demonstrate that the S protein-host receptor interactions are
critical for the development of animal models. This is further
emphasized by the ﬁnding that transgenic mice expressing hACE2
and mouse-adapted SARS-CoV strains both show enhanced repli-
cation and disease. As our understanding of host-receptor inter-
actions develops, application of this knowledge will facilitate the
development animal models for emerging coronaviruses.
Animal models of MERS coronavirus
Mouse models
Both wild-type mice and knockout strains have been evaluated
as models of MERS-CoV infection (Coleman et al., 2014a). In these
studies, eight week-old BALB/c, 129SvEv, and 129SvEv STAT1 /
mice were intranasally inoculated with 120 or 1200 TCID50 of
EMC-2012. None of the mice lost weight or developed clinical
signs, and all of the mice survived challenge. On days 2 and 4 post-
infection, lungs were harvested and viral load was assayed by
titration on Vero cells or by qRT-PCR. RT-PCR analysis for genomic
RNA indicated that the virus was present on day 2; however, no
subgenomic mRNA transcripts, indicative of active replication,
were detected and replicating virus could not be cultured from
lung homogenates. Furthermore, mice did not develop pulmonary
pathology (Coleman et al., 2014a). Analysis of the MERS-CoV host
receptor (DPP4) expression by immunohistochemistry and RT-PCR
indicated that low levels of DPP4 were expressed in the lungs
(Coleman et al., 2014a), and early studies on the binding efﬁciency
of MERS-CoV S protein RBD to mouse cells (LR7 cell line) showed
low binding efﬁciency (Raj et al., 2013, Table S1). Collectively, these
studies demonstrated that mice are naturally non-permissive to
MERS-CoV and inbred strains do not represent a suitable small
animal model.
Syrian hamster model
Based on the success of hamsters as a model for SARS-CoV, they
were similarly evaluated as a model of MERS-CoV infection (de
Wit et al., 2013b). Syrian hamsters were given either 103 or 106
TCID50 of EMC-2012 by intratracheal inoculation or 4102 TCID50
via aerosol. Animals were monitored for clinical disease, and nasal,
oropharyngeal, urogenital, and rectal swabs were collected daily
from days 1 to 11 post-infection. Inoculated animals did not
display clinical signs or weight loss, and all swabs were negative
for viral RNA by qRT-PCR (de Wit et al., 2013b). Tissues were
collected on days 2, 4, 8, 14, and 21 post-infection. On days 2, 4,
and 8, vRNA could not be detected in the lungs, spleen, or
mandibular lymph nodes by qRT-PCR, and no signiﬁcant histo-
pathology was observed in the lungs, trachea, kidney, and brain.
To further determine if the hamsters had been infected, Mx gene
expression was assayed as an indicator of an innate immune
response. In MERS-CoV inoculated animals, Mx expression
was similar to that of mock-infected infected animals. To verify
that the host receptor of MERS-CoV was expressed in hamsters,
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immunohistochemistry for DPP4 was performed. DPP4 was
expressed at high levels in bronchiolar epithelium and smooth
muscle in the lung, and also in the glomerular parietal epithelium
and nerve tissue in the kidney (de Wit et al., 2013b). Collectively,
these results indicate that similar to mice, hamsters are not
permissive to MERS-CoV; however, in contrast to mice, hamsters
do show high levels of DPP4 expression.
Ferret model
To potentially overcome host factors that may limit infection in
rodents, ferrets were evaluated as a model for MERS-CoV (Raj et
al., 2014). Four animals were inoculated intranasally and intra-
tracheally with 1106 TCID50 of EMC-2012. Nasal and throat
swabs were collected at intervals from 1 to 14 days post-
infection and assayed for viral replication. Virus was not recovered
from the swabs and qRT-PCR analysis demonstrated that low
levels of viral RNA were present only on days 1 and 2 post-
infection (Raj et al., 2014). Ferrets also failed to seroconvert,
further evidence that the animals had not been infected. In
subsequent experiments, primary ferret kidney cells were shown
to be resistant to MERS-CoV infection despite high levels of DPP4
expression. Transfection of an expression plasmid for human DPP4
into primary ferret kidney cells rendered the cells susceptible to
MERS-CoV infection, demonstrating that ferret DPP4 was the
major host restriction factor. Further in vitro experiments with
chimeric human-ferret DPP4 constructs demonstrated that the
DPP4 receptor-binding domain (RBD) was responsible for the
relative resistance or susceptibility of ferret cells to infection with
MERS-CoV (Raj et al., 2014). These ﬁndings demonstrate that
ferrets, like hamsters and mice, are not a suitable as a model of
MERS-CoV infection.
Non-human primate models
Two species of NHP have been evaluated as models of MERS-
CoV infection. These include the rhesus macaque and common
marmoset (de Wit et al., 2013a; Falzarano et al., 2014; Munster et
al., 2013; Yao et al., 2014). Both species are susceptible to MERS-
CoV infection; however, the extent of replication and disease
severity vary. Upon a combined intranasal, intratracheal, oral and
ocular inoculation with 1107 TCID50 EMC-2012 strain, Rhesus
macaques develop mild clinical signs consisting of decreased food
intake, nasal swelling, increased respiratory rate, and elevated
white blood cells counts early after infection (days 1–2 p.i.) (de
Wit et al., 2013a; Munster et al., 2013). All animals survived until
the designated endpoint of day 6 post-infection. vRNA was
detected in nasal swabs on days 1 and 3, and in most animals
was cleared by day 6. Replicating virus could be recovered from
lung tissue (Munster et al., 2013) and titers decreased from day
3 to 6 post-infection. Examination of viral dissemination through-
out the respiratory tract by qRT-PCR demonstrated that vRNA
could be detected in the nasal mucosa, trachea, mediastinal lymph
nodes, conjunctiva, oronasopharynx, and bronchi on day 3. Viral
loads decreased by day 6 and vRNA could not be detected in the
nasal mucosa and conjunctiva at this later time point (de Wit et al.,
2013a). Gross examination of multiple organs on day 3 and
6 revealed that pathology was restricted to the lungs with 0–75%
of each lung lobe containing lesions. Consistent with this observa-
tion, vRNA could not be detected in the kidney or bladder. Further
histopathological analysis found that animals displayed mild to
marked interstitial pneumonia on day 3 that progressed to
abundant alveolar edema and formation of hyaline membranes
on day 6 (de Wit et al., 2013a; Munster et al., 2013).
In an analogous study, four Rhesus macaques were intratrache-
ally inoculated with 6.5107 TCID50 of EMC-2012. Two animals
were maintained for 28 days and two animals were necropsied on
day 3 p.i. All of the animals showed an increase in temperature on
days 1–2, had reduced water intake, and survived the infection.
RNA was not detected in nasal, oropharyngeal, and cloacal swabs
collected at regular intervals. Radiographic imaging on days 3 and
5 showed interstitial inﬁltrates indicative of pneumonia, and
replicating virus was isolated from lung samples on day 3. Virus
could not be isolated from any other tissue including trachea,
brain, and kidney (Yao et al., 2014). Similar to the previous study,
gross examination revealed lesions restricted to the lung, and
microscopic analysis showed multifocal mild to moderate inter-
stitial pneumonia. Animals also developed serum neutralizing
antibody responses that were detected on day 7, peaked on day
14 (1:320) and remained elevated at day 28 (1:160) (Yao et al.,
2014).
Taken together, these studies show that infection of Rhesus
macaques with MERS-CoV results in a transient lung infection
with associated pneumonia. The discrepancies in the extent of
virus replication in the respiratory tract, observations of nasal
swelling, and isolation of virus from nasal swabs most likely reﬂect
the use of multiple inoculation routes in the earlier studies.
Animals showed mild clinical disease early during infection and
mortality was not observed. Thus, Rhesus macaques do not
recapitulate the severe infection observed in human cases; how-
ever, IFN-α and ribavirin were evaluated in this model and were
shown to limit infection (Falzarano et al., 2013).
Based on modeling of MERS-CoV S protein–DPP4 interactions,
the common marmoset was evaluated as model of MERS-CoV
(Falzarano et al., 2014). To recapitulate severe disease marmosets
were given a total of 5.2106 TCID50 of EMC-2012 via a combina-
tion of intranasal, oral, ocular, and intratracheal routes. Clinical
disease ranged from moderate to severe, with animals showing
increased respiratory rate, decreased body temperature, loss of
appetite, and decreased activity. Peak clinical illness was observed
between days 4 and 6, and 2 of nine animals were euthanized due
to severe disease. Radiological evaluation revealed evidence of
moderate to severe interstitial inﬁltration in both lower lung lobes
on day 3 and 6; by day 9 the remaining animals had reduced
inﬁltration indicative of recovery. On day 1 all throat swabs
and 8/9 nasal swabs were positive for vRNA. Viral load in the
nose and throat swabs decreased by day 3, but vRNA was
consistently isolated from throat swabs in a proportion of animals
as late as 13 days post-infection. In the respiratory tract, vRNA
could be detected from days 2–6 in the conjunctiva, nasal mucosa,
trachea, mediastinal lymph node, and all lung lobes. In addition,
two animals showed evidence of viremia with vRNA detected in
the blood and vRNA was detected in multiple organs including the
kidney, liver, and heart, indicating systemic dissemination of the
virus. However, given that the animals were inoculated via multi-
ple routes this may have facilitated systemic infection and spread
throughout the respiratory tract.
Histopathological analysis on day 3 revealed acute bronchoin-
terstitial pnemonia with viral antigen present in regions of
pathological change. By day 6, acute pneumonia was still promi-
nent, with type II pneumocyte hyperplasia and consolidation of
pulmonary ﬁbrin resulting in hyaline membrane formation. Con-
sistent with the severe lung infection, type I pneumocytes,
bronchiolar epithelial cells, and smooth muscle cells were all
found to express DPP4 (Falzarano et al., 2014). Thus, the common
marmoset reproduces several features of MERS-CoV infection, and
can potentially be used to evaluate novel therapies for human use.
Role of host receptor DPP4 in animal models of MERS-CoV
To understand the restriction of MERS-CoV replication in small
animals, evidence of host restriction at the level of DPP4 sequence
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was sought. The crystal structure of the S protein bound to DPP4
has been solved (Wang et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2013). At the interface
between the S protein RBD and DPP4, 14 residues of the S protein
RBD have direct contact with 15 residues of hDPP4 (see Table 2)
(Wang et al., 2013). The interaction between DPP4 and the S
protein RBD has two major binding patches. Patch 1 consists of
hDPP4 residues K267 and R336 interacting with a negatively
charged surface consisting of E536, D537, and D539 of the S
protein RBD. In addition, Y499 of the S protein RBD forms a
hydrogen bond with R336 of DPP4 (Wang et al., 2013; Lu et al.,
2013). The second major binding patch consists of DPP4 residues
L294, I295, H298, R317, and Q344. Residues L294 and I295 interact
with S protein RBD residues L506, W553, and V555, and DPP4
residues R317 and Q344 form a salt-bridge and hydrogen bond
with S protein RBD residues D510 and E513, respectively.
As mentioned above, initial studies with chimeric DPP4 pro-
teins demonstrated that incorporation of the human DPP4 S
protein RBD (residues 246–505) into ferret DPP4 rendered ferret
cells susceptible to MERS-CoV infection (Raj et al., 2014). To further
understand the role of the S protein RBD in host restriction,
subsequent studies compared the MERS-CoV S protein binding
afﬁnity of human and mouse DPP4, and that of several potential
zoonotic reservoir species including camels, horses, goats, and bats
(Barlan et al., 2014). Introduction of the human DPP4 S protein
binding domain into mouse DPP4 rendered mouse cells suscep-
tible to MERS-CoV infection, thus emphasizing the role of the
DPP4 sequence in host restriction. Comparison of human DPP4
binding afﬁnity to that other species demonstrated that human
DPP4 had the highest afﬁnity for the S protein RBD, and afﬁnity
decreased as follows: human4horses4camels4goats4bats.
Expression of DPP4 from all these species rendered cells suscep-
tible to infection, while mouse DPP4 did not permit infection
(Barlan et al., 2014). Further characterization of amino acid
residues at the interface of DPP4 with the S protein RBD identiﬁed
6 differences between mouse and human DPP4 (see Table 2)
(Barlan et al., 2014; van Doremalen et al., 2014; Cockrell et al.,
2014). Structural modeling predicted that ﬁve amino acid differ-
ences at residues 288[282], 294[288], 295[289], 336[330], and 346
[340] (human [mouse] DPP4 numbering) account for the lack of
binding afﬁnity in mouse DPP4 (Cockrell et al., 2014). Introduction
of the human DPP4 residues at all 5 sites in mouse DPP4 resulted
in highly efﬁcient infection. Selective mutation of only residues
336 and 346 associated with the patch 1 binding region, or
residues 288, 294, 295 in the patch 2 domain did not restore
highly efﬁcient infection, indicating that interactions with both
patch regions were required for high afﬁnity DPP4-S protein
binding. In support of this ﬁnding, the introduction of human
residues A294L and T330R associated with patch 1 and 2, respec-
tively, resulted in efﬁcient infection (Cockrell et al., 2014).
In the context of the hamster model, expression of human
DPP4 in non-permissive (BHK) hamster cells, rendered cells
susceptible to MERS-CoV infection, indicating that host restriction
occurred at the level of the receptor (van Doremalen et al., 2014).
Comparison of the hamster and human DPP4 sequences identiﬁed
ﬁve amino acid differences in the DPP4 S protein RBD interface
(Table 2) (van Doremalen et al., 2014). Introduction of the human
residues into hamster DPP4 permitted infection of hamster cells,
and modeling studies suggested that two residues at positions 291
and 336 were largely responsible for the host restriction (van
Doremalen et al., 2014). This is in agreement with studies on
mouse DPP4 that show mutation R336T, also present in the
hamster DPP4, decreases infection by MERS-CoV (Cockrell et al.,
2014).
Collectively, these studies demonstrate that host restriction
of MERS-CoV is predominantly dictated by DPP4 sequence.
To explore additional animal models we sequenced cotton rat
DPP4 (see Table 2) and found the S protein binding residues to be
similar to those of the hamster and ferret, suggesting that cotton
rats would be refractory to infection. Indeed comparison of
human, rhesus macaque and common marmoset DPP4 sequences
show 100% identity at the residues that interact with MERS-CoV S
protein. However, the differences in disease severity between
Rhesus macaques and common marmosets indicate that other
host factors such as the presence or expression levels of S-cleaving
proteases (i.e. TMPRSS2) (Cockrell et al., 2014) may inﬂuence
infection and disease severity. Regardless of additional host
factors, the interaction of DPP4 with MERS-CoV S protein should
be the initial and predominant focus of small animal model
development.
Approaches to developing small animal models of MERS-CoV infection
Development of animal models for SARS-CoV demonstrated
that both mouse adaptation and the generation of transgenic mice
expressing hACE2 resulted in enhanced permissiveness and dis-
ease. Moving forward with animal models of MERS-CoV, similar
strategies should be utilized. Mouse adaptation, or adaptation to
ferrets or hamsters, is unlikely to be fruitful approaches because
infectious virus could not be isolated from these animals and the
MERS-CoV S protein failed to bind DPP4 from these species. To
overcome this barrier, reverse genetics approaches could be used
to introduce mutations into the MERS-CoV S protein RBD to
enhance or promote interaction with DPP4 of different species.
Table 2
DPP4 amino acid sequences from different species predicted to interact with the MERS Spike protein.
Species Amino acid residues that differ from human DPP4 (human DPP4 numberinga) Accession no.
229 267 286 288 291 294 295 298 317 322 336 341 344 346
Human N K Q T A L I H R Y R V Q I NM_001935
Rhesus macaque KF574267
Common marmosetn XM_002749392
Camel V KJ002534
Mouse P A R T S V NM_001159543
Hamstern E T T L V XM_007610182
Ferret E D S T Y S E E T DQ266376
Cotton ratnn E E A T T L V
Bat T K KC249974
Residues in patch 1 are underlined and residues in patch 2 are in italics and underlined.
n Predicted sequence.
nn Unpublished sequence generated by sequencing DPP4 from cotton rat lung tissue.
a Modiﬁed from van Doremalen et al. (2014).
T.C. Sutton, K. Subbarao / Virology 479-480 (2015) 247–258 255
This has particular utility in outbred animals in which genetic
manipulation of the host receptor would be challenging.
As demonstrated with SARS-CoV, the generation of mice
expressing human DPP4 may be the most rapid strategy to yield
a small animal model. Indeed, when mice were transduced with
an adenovirus vector that expressed human DPP4, they were
susceptible to MERS-CoV infection and developed pneumonia,
albeit without associated mortality (Zhao et al., 2014). Transgenic
mice could be generated via traditional methods or using the
CRISPR–Cas9 (Doudna and Charpentier, 2014) system to replace
mouse DPP4 with human DPP4 or to introduce a mouse DPP4
carrying the mutations that promote S protein binding. With
either transgenic strategy or with the development of a reverse
genetics adapted strain, replication and pathogenesis will have to
be characterized to meet the criteria for the FDA Animal Rule.
Despite the lack of suitable models, several groups are devel-
oping vaccines and therapeutics against MERS-CoV (Zhang et al.,
2014a, 2014b; Chan et al., 2013; Hart et al., 2014; Coleman et al.,
2014b; de Wilde et al., 2014; Dyall et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2014).
Vaccine candidates are being evaluated for immunogenicity and
antivirals are being evaluated in vitro. Medical countermeasures
have the potential to advance along the path towards regulatory
approval if a susceptible small animal model can be developed and
used in conjunction with the marmoset model. In concert with
public health efforts, novel therapies could curb the on-going
MERS-CoV epidemic and reduce the morbidity and mortality
associated with MERS-CoV.
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